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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a novel technique for fully automated
procedure–modular verification of Java programs equipped
with method–local and global assertions that specify safety
properties of sequences of method invocations. Modularity
of verification is achieved by relativizing the correctness of
global properties on the local properties rather than on the
implementations of methods, and is based on the construc-
tion of maximal models. Tool support is provided by means
of ProMoVer, a tool that is essentially a wrapper around a
previously developed tool set for compositional verification
of control flow safety properties, where program data is ab-
stracted away completely. We evaluate the technique on a
small but realistic case study.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modularity is a design paradigm that aims at controlling
the complexity of developing large software and facilitates
the reuse of components. When applied to verification, i.e.,
to establish the formal correctness of a software product,
modularity requires that correctness of the software mod-
ules (components) is specified and verified independently
(locally) for each module, while the correctness of the whole
system is specified through a global property, the correctness
of which is verified relative to the local specifications rather
than relative to the actual implementations of the modules.
Such an approach allows an independent evolution of the
implementations of individual modules, only requiring the
re–establishment of their local correctness (provided the lo-
cal specifications have not changed).
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Hoare logic provides one popular framework for modu-
lar specification and verification of software. For procedural
programming languages it is natural to take the individual
procedures as modules, in order to achieve scalability. In
static checkers such as ESC/Java [6], one provides as in-
put a program annotated with specification assertions - as
comments ignored by the compiler - and the tool then auto-
matically checks the code against the specification, assuming
that called methods respect their specification.
While Hoare logic allows the local effect of invoking a given
procedure to be specified, temporal logic is better suited
for capturing its interaction with the environment, such as
the allowed sequences of procedure invocations. This pa-
per shows that procedure–modular verification is appropri-
ate also for this second class of correctness properties.
We have developed an automated verification tool, Pro-
MoVer, that takes as input a Java program annotated with
global and method–local correctness assertions written in
temporal logic, and automatically invokes a number of tools
from a previously developed tool set for compositional ver-
ification [9] to perform the individual local and global cor-
rectness checks1. Essentially, ProMoVer is a wrapper that
automatically performs a standard verification scenario in
the general tool set. Validity of the approach is shown on an
electronic purse application that is used for securely trans-
ferring money. Such types of security relevant applications
are an important target for formal verification techniques.
To allow efficient algorithmic modular verification, the
tool set currently abstracts away from all data. In par-
ticular, method calls in Java programs are approximated
by a non–deterministic choice on possible method imple-
mentations that the virtual call resolution might resolve to.
This may seem like a severe restriction, but still many use-
ful properties can be expressed. Section 5 shows how the
tool set is used to show the absence of non–atomic methods
within a Java Card transaction (i.e., a mechanism to guar-
antee atomic updates). Other useful properties that can be
expressed and verified in our framework are for example:
• a given method that changes certain sensitive data is
only called from within another dedicated authentica-
tion method, i.e., unauthorized access is not possible;
• before program state is being dumped into memory, a
serialization method is called to arrange the state;
• in a voting system, candidate selection has to be fin-
ished, before the vote can be confirmed;
1ProMoVer is available via web–based interface [15]
• in a door access control system, the password has to be
checked before the door is unlocked, and the password
can only be changed if the door is unlocked.
Extending the technique with data over finite domains will
allow for a wider range of properties and possible applica-
tions, but needs to be combined with abstraction techniques
to control the complexity of verification. Such an extension
will be investigated in future work.
Overview.
Section 2 presents the tool from a user’s point–of–view.
The next section summarizes our verification framework,
describing the underlying program model and logic, and
the compositional verification method based on construct-
ing maximal models. Then, Section 4 describes the Pro-
MoVer tool, while Section 5 describes a small but realistic
case study using the tool. Finally, the last section draws
conclusions and suggests directions for future research.
Related Work.
As already pointed out, the present work is based on a
previously developed method and tool set for compositional
verification of control flow safety properties [9, 8]. Essen-
tially, we provide a wrapper around the tool set to support
the fully automated procedure–modular verification of pro-
grams annotated with temporal correctness assertions.
A non–compositional verification method based on a pro-
gram model closely related to ours is presented by Alur and
others [4]. It proposes a temporal logic CaRet for nested
calls and returns (generalized to a logic for nested words
in [2]) that can be used to specify regular properties of lo-
cal paths within a procedure that skips over calls to other
procedures.
Maven is a modular verification tool addressing temporal
properties of procedural languages, but in the context of
aspects [7].
Mu¨ller was the first to propose a sound modular Hoare–
style verification technique for object–oriented languages [14].
Recent work by Alur and Chauhuri proposes a unification of
Hoare–style and Manna–Pnueli–style temporal reasoning for
procedural programs, presenting proof rules for procedure–
modular temporal reasoning [3].
2. THE TOOL: A USER’S VIEW
The goal of the present work is the development of a fully
automated tool for procedure–modular verification of con-
trol flow safety properties of Java programs. These prop-
erties are provided to the tool as assertions in the form of
program annotations: programs are annotated with global
program properties and methods are annotated with local
method properties. We use a JML–like syntax for annota-
tions (cf. [13]), and similarly present them as special com-
ments. The tool checks (i) whether the method implementa-
tions respect the local properties, and (ii) whether the local
properties are sufficient to ensure the global property. If this
is not the case, a counter example is provided in the form of
a program behavior that violates the respective property.
Our approach is procedure–modular in the sense that cor-
rectness of the global program property is relativized on the
local properties of the individual methods. Thus, the over-
all verification task naturally divides into two independent
subtasks:
(i) check that each method implementation satisfies its
local property, and
(ii) check that the composition of local properties entails
the global property.
Notice that the second subtask only relies on the local prop-
erties and does not require the implementations of the indi-
vidual methods.
Control flow safety properties can be expressed in auto-
mata–based or process–algebraic notations, as well as in
temporal logics such as LTL [16] and the safety fragment
of the modal µ-calculus [12]. Our tool currently supports
the latter two notations, as illustrated by the example be-
low.
In addition to the properties, the tool also requires global
and local interfaces. A global interface consists of a list of
all methods provided (i.e., implemented) and required (i.e.,
used) by the program. The local interface of method m con-
tains a list of the methods required by the method (as the
provided method is obvious). The user only has to spec-
ify the local required methods, the global interface can be
deduced from the local method information.
/** @global_LTL_prop:
* even -> X ((even && !entry) W odd)
*/
pub l i c c l a s s EvenOdd {
/** @local_interface: requires {odd}
*
* @local_prop:
* nu X1. (([ even call even]ff) /\ ([tau]X1) /\
* [even caret odd] nu X2.
* (([ even call even]ff) /\
* ([even caret odd]ff) /\ ([tau]X2))
*/
pub l i c boolean even ( i n t n) {
i f (n == 0) return true ;
e l s e return odd (n−1) ;
}
/** @local_interface: requires {even}
*
* @local_prop:
* nu X1. (([odd call odd]ff) /\ ([tau]X1) /\
* [odd caret even] nu X2.
* (([odd call odd]ff) /\
* ([odd caret even]ff) /\ ([tau]X2))
*/
pub l i c boolean odd ( i n t n) {
i f (n == 0) return f a l s e ;
e l s e return even (n−1) ;
}
}
Figure 1: A simple annotated Java program
Example 1. Consider the annotated Java program in Fi-
gure 1. It consists of two methods, even and odd. The pro-
gram is annotated with a global control flow safety property.
As mentioned above, the global interface is extracted from
the local interfaces. In addition, every method is annotated
with a local property and an interface specifying the required
methods.
Definitions 4 and 5 below formally define the logics used
to write the specifications; this example just gives the intu-
itive idea. The global specification is written in LTL and ex-
presses that “in every program execution starting in method
even, the first call is not to method even itself”. The local
property of method even is written in the safety fragment of
the modal µ-calculus and expresses that “method even can
only call method odd, and after returning from the call, no
other method can be called” (where ff denotes false). The
local property of method odd has a similar meaning.
As explained above, the annotated program is correct if
(i) methods even and odd meet their respective local proper-
ties, and (ii) the composition of local properties entails the
global one. In fact, the annotated program is correct and our
tool therefore returns an affirmative result.
Example 2. If in the previous example we change the
global property to “in every program execution starting in
method even, the first call is to method even itself”, the an-
notated program becomes incorrect, because subtask (ii) fails,
as demonstrated by the following program execution:
(even, ε)
even call odd−−−−−−−→(odd, even) odd ret even−−−−−−−→(even, ε)
This execution is allowed by the local properties, but violates
the global one. Our tool therefore returns this as a counter
example.
Next, we present the formal framework and the Pro-
MoVer tool that support this style of procedure–modular
verification.
3. FRAMEWORK
This section outlines the theoretical framework upon which
our verification method rests. It is heavily based on our ear-
lier work on compositional verification [9, 8].
3.1 Program Model and Logic
We begin by formally defining the program model and
logics for specifying properties.
Definition 1 (Model). A model is a (Kripke) struc-
ture M = (S,L,→, A, λ) where S is a set of states, L a set
of labels, →⊆ S × L × S a labeled transition relation, A a
set of atomic propositions, and λ : S → P(A) a valuation,
assigning to each state s the set of atomic propositions that
hold in s. An initialized model is a pair (M, E) with M a
model and E ⊆ S a set of initial states.
Our program model is based on the notion of flow graph,
abstracting away from all data in the original program. It
is essentially a collection of method graphs, one for each
method of the program. Let Meth be a countably infinite
set of methods names. A method graph is an instance of the
general notion of initialized model.
Definition 2 (Method graph). A method graph for
method m ∈ Meth over a set M ⊆Meth of method names is
an initialized model (Mm, Em) whereMm = (Vm, Lm,→m,
Am, λm) is a finite model and Em ⊆ Vm is a non-empty set
of entry points of m. Vm is the set of control nodes of m,
Lm = M ∪ {ε}, Am = {m, r}, and λm : Vm → P(Am) so
that m ∈ λm(v) for all v ∈ Vm (i.e., each node is tagged
with its method name). The nodes v ∈ Vm with r ∈ λm(v)
are return points.
Notice that methods can have multiple entry points. Flow
graphs that are extracted from program source have single
entry points, but the maximal models that we generate for
compositional verification can have multiple entry points.
Every flow graph G is equipped with an interface I =
(I+, I−), denoted G : I, where I+, I− ⊆ Meth are the pro-
vided and externally required methods, respectively. Inter-
faces are needed when constructing maximal flow graphs (see
Section 3.2). A flow graph is closed if its interface does not
require any methods, and it is open otherwise.
Flow graph composition is defined as the disjoint union unionmulti
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Figure 2: Flow graph of EvenOdd
Example 3. Figure 2 shows the flow graph of the pro-
gram from Figure 1. Its interface is ({even, odd}, ∅), thus
the flow graph is closed. It consists of two method graphs,
for method even and method odd, respectively. Entry nodes
are depicted as usual by incoming edges without source.
We define the behavior of a flow graph as a labeled tran-
sition system (LTS). We use transition label τ for inter-
nal transfer of control, m1 call m2 for the invocation of
method m2 by method m1 when method m2 is provided by
the program, m2 ret m1 for the corresponding return from
the call, and label m1 caret m2 for the (atomic) invocation
of and return from an external method m2 by method m1.
Definition 3 (Behavior). Let G = (M, E) : (I+, I−)
be a flow graph such thatM = (V,L,→, A, λ). The behavior
of G is defined as initialized model b(G) = (Mb, Eb), where
Mb = (Sb, Lb,→b, Ab, λb), such that Sb = V × V ∗, i.e.,
states (or configurations) are pairs of control points v and
stacks σ, Lb = {m1 k m2 | k ∈ {call, ret}, m1,m2 ∈ I+}
∪ {m1 caret m2 | m1 ∈ I+ ∧ m2 ∈ I−} ∪ {τ}, Ab = A,
λb((v, σ)) = λ(v), and →b⊆ Sb × Lb × Sb is defined by the
rules:
[transfer] (v, σ)
τ−→(v′, σ)
if m ∈ I+, v ε−→mv′, v |= ¬r
[call] (v1, σ)
m1 callm2−−−−−−−−→(v2, v′1 · σ)
if m1,m2 ∈ I+, v1 m2−−→m1v′1, v1 |= ¬r, v2 |= m2, v2 ∈ E
[ret] (v2, v1 · σ) m2 retm1−−−−−−−→(v1, σ)
if m1,m2 ∈ I+, v2 |= m2 ∧ r, v1 |= m1
[caret] (v1, σ)
m1 caretm2−−−−−−−−→(v′1, σ)
if m1 ∈ I+,m2 ∈ I−, v1, v1 m2−−→m1v′1, v′1 |= m1, v1 |= ¬r
The set of initial configurations is defined by Eb = E×{ε},
where ε denotes the empty sequence over V .
Notice that return transitions always hand back control
to the caller of the method. Calls to external methods
are modeled with caret transitions that jump immediately
from the external method invocation to the corresponding
return, without considering the intermediate behavior. This
treatment of method calls is inspired by the temporal logic
CaRet mentioned in the introduction, and is convenient for
specifying the local behavior of flow graphs. When writing
global specifications, however, one has to be aware that in
this way possible callbacks from external methods are not
captured.
Example 4. Consider the flow graph from Example 3.
One example run through its (branching, infinite–state) be-
havior, from an initial to a final configuration, is:
(v0, ε)
τ−→(v1, ε) τ−→(v2, ε) even call odd−−−−−−−→(v5, v3) τ−→(v6, v3) τ−→
(v8, v3)
odd ret even−−−−−−−→(v3, ε)
Now, consider just the method graph of method even as an
open flow graph, having interface ({even}, {odd}). The local
contribution of method even to the above global behavior is
the following run:
(v0, ε)
τ−→(v1, ε) τ−→(v2, ε) even caret odd−−−−−−−−→(v3, ε)
An alternative way to express flow graph behavior is to
use pushdown systems (PDS). This can be exploited by using
pushdown system model checking for verifying behavioral
properties. In this work, we use PDS to express behaviors
and use the tool Moped to model check PDS against tem-
poral formulas [11].
The specification language for local behavioral proper-
ties, around which our compositional verification method is
centered, is simulation logic, the fragment of the modal µ–
calculus [12] with boxes and greatest fixed–points only. This
temporal logic is adequate for expressing safety properties.
Definition 4 (Simulation Logic). The formulae of
simulation logic are inductively defined by:
φ ::= p | ¬p | X | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | [a]φ | νX. φ
where p ∈ Ab, a ∈ Lb and X ranges over propositional vari-
ables.
Satisfaction on states (Mb, s) |= φ is defined in the stan-
dard fashion [12]. For instance, formula [a]φ holds of state s
in model Mb if φ holds in all states accessible from s via
an edge labeled a. An initialized model (Mb, Eb) satisfies a
formula φ, denoted (Mb, Eb) |= φ, if all its initial configura-
tions Eb satisfy φ. The constant formulae true (denoted tt)
and false (ff) are definable. For convenience, we use p⇒ φ
to abbreviate ¬p ∨ φ.
Safety properties can also be expressed in other formalisms
and logics, such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). In this pa-
per, we use the safety–fragment of LTL that uses the weak
version of until.
Definition 5 (Weak LTL). The formulae of LTL are
inductively defined by:
φ ::= p | ¬p | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | X φ | G φ | φ1 W φ2
where p ∈ Ab.
Satisfaction on states (Mb, s) |= φ is again defined in the
standard fashion [16]. For instance, formula X φ holds of
state s in model Mb if φ holds in the second state of every
run starting in s, while φ W ψ holds in s if for every run
starting in s, either φ holds in all states of the run, or ψ
holds in some state such that φ holds in all previous states.
Example 5. Consider the global LTL property of class
EvenOdd in Figure 1 and its intuitive meaning given in Ex-
ample 1. In the formula, && and ! are ASCII formats of
∧ and ¬ respectively, while entry is an atomic proposition
that holds at entry nodes of methods. The formula expresses
precisely the property “if program execution starts in method
even, then from the next state on, control stays in non–entry
points of even as long as it does not reach method odd”. As-
suming entry points are only reachable via calls, this inter-
pretation coincides with the one given in Example 1.
This fragment of LTL is somewhat less expressive than
simulation logic and can be uniformly encoded in it.
3.2 Compositional Verification
Our method for compositional verification is based on the
construction of maximal flow graphs from component prop-
erties. For a given property ψ and interface I, consider the
class of all flow graphs with interface I satisfying ψ. A max-
imal flow graph for ψ and I is a flow graph Max(ψ, I) that
satisfies exactly those properties that hold for all members
of the class. Thus, the maximal flow graph can be used
as a representative of the class for the purpose of checking
properties.
The main principle of compositional verification based on
maximal flow graphs can be presented, for a system with k
components, as a proof rule with k + 1 premises:
]
i=1,...,k
Gi |= φ
G1 |= ψ1 · · · Gk |= ψk
]
i=1,...,k
Max(ψi, Ii) |= φ
The principle states that the composition of components G1 :
I1, ...,Gk : Ik satisfies a global property φ if for some local
properties ψi satisfied by the corresponding components Gi,
the composition of the maximal flow graphs for ψi and Ii
satisfies property φ. For details the reader is referred to [9].
In procedure–modular verification, we consider composi-
tional verification on the method level, i.e., we consider the
program methods as components. Let M be the set of pro-
gram methods, where k = |M |, and let ψi and Ci be the
specification and the implementation of method mi, respec-
tively. To instantiate the above compositional verification
principle to procedure–modular verification, the following
two independent tasks have to be performed:
(i) Checking Ci |= ψi for i = 1, ..., k.
For each method mi ∈M , (1) extract the method flow
graph Gi from Ci, and (2) model check Gi against ψi.
For the latter, we exploit the fact that flow graphs
are Kripke structures, and apply standard finite–state
model checking.
(ii) Checking ]
i=1,...,k
Max(ψi, Ii) |= φ
(1) Construct the maximal flow graphs Max(ψi, Ii)
for all method specifications ψi and interfaces Ii, then
(2) compose the graphs, resulting in flow graph GMax,
and finally (3) model check GMax against the global
property φ. For the latter, represent the behavior of
GMax as a PDS and use a standard PDS model checker.
Example 6. Consider again the annotated Java program
from Example 1. Following procedure–modular verifica-
tion, we first extract the method flow graphs of methods
even and odd, denoted Geven and Godd, respectively. Next,
we check Geven |= ψeven and Godd |= ψodd by standard fi-
nite state model checking. Independently, we construct the
maximal flow graphs of methods even and odd, denoted
Max(ψeven, Ieven) and Max(ψodd, Iodd), respectively, and
compose the graphs to obtain GMax = Max(ψeven, Ieven) unionmulti
Max(ψodd, Iodd). Finally, we translate GMax to a PDS and
model check the latter against the global property.
4. THE ProMoVer TOOL
This section presents ProMoVer, a tool for procedure–
modular verification of annotated Java programs, built on
top of a previously developed tool set for compositional ver-
ification described in [9]. ProMoVer is implemented in
Python and can be tested online [15].
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Figure 3: Overview of ProMoVer and its underlying tool
set
An overview of the individual tools from the tool set that
we have used in this work is shown in Figure 3. In the fig-
ure, Graph Tool is a collection of algorithms on flow graphs,
including flow graph composition unionmulti and translations of flow
graphs to different formats, used by other parts of the tool
set. In particular, we use here the flow graph composer and
the translators to CCS terms and PDS.
As input, ProMoVer accepts annotated Java programs
as exemplified in Section 2. The pre–processor uses the Java
Doclet API [1] to parse the annotations of the program and
passes the properties and interfaces to the other tools. The
two different tasks described in Section 3.2 are performed in
different blocks.
Block (I) is related to task (i): We extract the method
graphs of the program with the Analyzer tool that builds on
Soot [17] to extract flow graphs from Java bytecode. Then,
we use the Graph Tool to generate a CCS model for every
method graph, and we model check these models against
the respective method specifications using the Concurrency
Workbench (CWB) [5].
Block (II) is related to task (ii): We construct a maxi-
mal flow graph for every method using the Maximal Model
Constructor, compose the generated flow graphs and con-
vert the result to a PDS with the Graph Tool, and finally
use Moped [11] to model check the PDS against the global
LTL property.
The post–processor collects all model checking results and
converts these into a user–understandable format. It re-
turns a positive result if the result of all collected model
checking tasks is positive, and a negative result if at least
one of the model checking tasks does not succeed. In the
latter case, if one of the model checking tasks from block (I)
fails, ProMoVer returns the name of the method that does
not satisfy its specification. If it is the model checking task
from block (II) that fails, then ProMoVer transforms the
counter example provided by Moped into a program execu-
tion and returns this.
5. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes our experience with using Pro-
MoVer to verify control flow safety properties of the Java-
Purse application. This is a realistic e-commerce application
developed by Sun Microsystems to demonstrate the use of
the Java Card environment for developing electronic purse
applications2. Java Card technology provides a secure envi-
ronment developed by Sun Microsystems to support appli-
cations on smart cards. It is one of the leading interoperable
platforms for smart cards.
One of the features of the Java Card environment is the
transaction mechanism that ensures that data remains con-
sistent upon a power loss. Safe use of this mechanism de-
mands that certain methods are not called within a trans-
action. We show how this is expressed and verified for the
JavaPurse application.
5.1 The Java Card Transaction Mechanism
Smart cards have two types of writable memory, persis-
tent memory (EEPROM or Flash) and transient memory
(RAM). The Java Card memory model adheres to this. Tran-
sient memory needs constant power supply to store informa-
tion, while persistent memory can store data without power.
Smart cards do not have their own power supply; they de-
pend on the external source that comes from the card reader
device. Therefore, a problem known as card tear may occur:
a power loss when the card is suddenly disconnected from
the card reader. If a card tear occurs in the middle of up-
dating data from transient to persistent memory, the data
stored in transient memory is lost and may cause the smart
card to be in an inconsistent state.
To cope with card tears (and related problems, such as
resets), Java Card provides a transaction mechanism. This
can be used to ensure that several updates are executed as a
single atomic operation, i.e., either all updates are performed
or none. The mechanism is provided through methods be-
ginTransaction for beginning a transaction, commitTrans-
action for ending a transaction with performed updates,
and abortTransaction for ending a transaction with dis-
carded updates [10]. These methods are provided by class
JCSystem of the Java Card API.
The Java Card API contains some non-atomic methods
that cannot be used when a transaction is in progress. No-
tably, the class javacard.framework.Util, that provides
functionality to store and update byte arrays, contains meth-
2The JavaPurse source code can be downloaded from Sun
Microsystems, http://java.sun.com/javacard/.
ods arrayCopyNonAtomic and arrayFillNonAtomic that may
not be used within a transaction. (For safe array updat-
ing within a transaction, the class also provides the atomic
method arrayCopy.) We show how ProMoVer can be used
to verify that applications comply with this policy.
5.2 The JavaPurse Application
JavaPurse is a smart card electronic purse application pro-
viding secure money transfers. The application contains a
balance record denoting the user’s current and maximum
credits. It contains methods processInitializeTransac-
tion and processCompleteTransaction that initialize, per-
form and complete a secure transaction using the Java Card
transaction mechanism. Further, it also contains methods to
update information related to a loyalty program, and to vali-
date and update the values of transactions, balance and PIN
code. These data updates use the API methods arrayFill-
NonAtomic, arrayCopyNonAtomic and arrayCopy mentioned
above. This functionality of the JavaPurse application is
implemented by means of 19 methods with approximately
1K lines of code in total.
The JavaPurse application contains 222 method calls, 15 of
which are method calls to arrayCopyNonAtomic and 6 to
arrayFillNonAtomic. Transactions are used in two places.
One of the transactions contains 2 API method invocations,
the other contains 3 API method invocations. Method abort-
Transaction is not used in JavaPurse, and is not considered
here.
5.3 Specification of JavaPurse
As mentioned above, we want to ensure formally that the
non-atomic methods arrayCopyNonAtomic and arrayFill-
NonAtomic are not invoked within a transaction. Hence, we
state the following global control flow safety property for
JavaPurse:
In every program execution, after a transaction
begins, methods arrayCopyNonAtomic and ar-
rayFillNonAtomic are not called until the trans-
action ends.
This safety property can be expressed with the following
LTL formula, with which we annotated the program:
G (beginTransaction→
¬NonAtomicOp W commitTransaction)
where NonAtomicOp can be either arrayCopyNonAtomic or
arrayFillNonAtomic.
Next, we annotated every method of JavaPurse with a lo-
cal specification consisting of an interface and a formula in
simulation logic. The specifications were obtained in a post–
hoc manner, after inspecting the code. The intention is that
local method specifications capture the allowed sequences
of method calls made from within the specified method,
but in an abstract away, allowing for possible evolution of
the method implementations. The constructed formulae are
comparatively long, but follow the same simple pattern as
for methods even and odd in Figure 1. To simplify the spec-
ification task, we plan in future work to provide support for
appropriate specification patterns.
As discussed below, the global property is then proven
on the basis of these local method specifications only, i.e.,
without looking at the method implementations.
5.4 Verification Results
After annotating the JavaPurse program, it is passed to
ProMoVer. The flow graph extracted from the program
code as part of verification subtask (i) consists of 1018 nodes
and 1128 edges. ProMoVer partitioned this graph to ob-
tain the individual method graphs, and checked each of these
against its local specification.
Subtask (ii) ensures that the local method specifications
guarantee the global property. First, for each method a max-
imal flow graph is generated from its local specification. The
maximal flow graphs are then composed, and the resulting
flow graph, consisting of 200 nodes and 1464 edges, is trans-
lated by ProMoVer to a PDS and model checked against
the global property.
ProMoVer returns a positive result, meaning that all
method implementations in JavaPurse meet their local spec-
ifications, and that the method specifications indeed entail
the global safety property.
The whole verification is performed by ProMoVer in
150 seconds, running on a SUN SPARC machine. Sub-
task (i) is performed in about 142 seconds, subtask (ii) in
about 4 seconds, and the remaining 4 seconds are spent on
pre– and post–processing. This relatively slow performance
is largely due to the external tool Soot, part of our Ana-
lyzer, which needed 141 seconds to extract the control flow
graph.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper describes the ProMoVer tool that allows
to automatically verify control flow safety properties of se-
quences of method invocations in a procedure–modular fash-
ion. ProMoVer takes as input a Java program annotated
with temporal correctness assertions. The technique builds
on a previously developed general method for the composi-
tional verification of programs with procedures [9].
Because of the focus on modularity at the procedure level,
we can take advantage of the fact that local properties are
relatively small and simple to write. Moreover, this focus
also makes checking whether the local properties are suffi-
cient to guarantee the global property efficient. We believe
that writing properties at procedure–level is intuitive for a
programmer, because this is the level of abstraction at which
he thinks about the program. However, we plan to perform a
comparison with other, less fine–grained notions of software
modules.
The experiment with JavaPurse shows that safety proper-
ties of realistic Java programs can be conveniently expressed
in a light–weight notation and verified automatically with
ProMoVer. Modularity of the approach allows an inde-
pendent evolution of the implementations of the individual
methods, only requiring the re–establishment of their local
correctness.
Still, some issues remain to be resolved in order to increase
the utility of the tool. If method specifications are to be
produced from an implementation, i.e., post–hoc, as in the
above exercise, automated support has to be provided to
reduce the manual task and the risk for specification errors.
For pre–hoc specification, notations based on automata or
process algebra may prove more convenient than simulation
logic, and may also allow more efficient maximal flow graph
construction.
As explained, currently local method specifications are
written in simulation logic, and global properties in weak
LTL. Ultimately, our goal is that all specifications (local
and behavioral) can be written in various temporal logics
and different notations, e.g., based on automata, or using
patterns to abbreviate common specification idioms. The
tool set should then provide translations into a common
logic where necessary. So far, for the development of the
tool set our focus has been on simulation logic, because of
its expressiveness. However, because of limitations on the
current PDS model checkers, global properties have to be
written in weak LTL.
Many interesting safety properties require program data to
be taken into account. As a first step towards handling data,
work has begun on extending our verification framework and
tool set to Boolean programs.
Finally, to investigate the scalability of the approach, we
plan to perform a significantly larger case study.
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